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1. The term “Constructive Analysis” in contrast with the term “Computable Analy- 
sis” usually implies foundational undertones. Indeed, Constructive Analysis of 
A.A. Markov, Jr. is a part of Markov’s Constructive Mathematics, i.e. the Mathe- 
matics developed along with Markov’s Philosophy and worldoutlook. As this Philos- 
ophy makes a strong accent on effectivity of mathematical constructions, no wonder 
that many of the results, that were obtained in Markov’s School deal, in fact, with 
computability as such and, therefore, retain their value outside of the foundational or 
philosophical context. 
I will try to present a review, or rather an essay, on Markov’s Constructive Analysis 
and Constructive Mathematics in comparison with other major trends in Constructivism 
and Computable Analysis. By no means do I pretend to cover the subject in full. 
I choose a few topics of my preference. 
I would like to dedicate this article to the memory of my teacher Andrei Andreevich 
Markov, Jr. (1903-1979). 
2. The Russian School of constructive Mathematics was founded by A.A. Markov, 
Jr. in the late 1940s-early 1950s. In private conversations Markov used to state that 
he nurtured a type of constructive convictions for a very long time, long before the 
Second World War. This is an interesting fact if one considers that this was the time 
when Markov worked very actively in various areas of classical Mathematics and 
achieved first-rate results. Perhaps it is worth mentioning that Markov was a scientist 
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with a very wide area of interest. In his freshman years he published works in Chem- 
istry and he graduated from Leningrad University (1924) with a major in Physics. 
Besides Mathematics, he published works in theoretical Physics, Celestial Mechanics, 
Theory of Plasticity (cf., eg., [54: introduction by Nagomy]; this monograph (originally 
in Russian, 1984) was completed and published by Nagomy already after Markov’s 
death). It is almost inevitable that a scientist of such universality arrives to philosoph- 
ical and foundational issues. As far as I am aware the explicitly “constructive” period 
of Markov’s activities began with his work on Thue’s Problem which had stood open 
since 1914. Thue’s Problem was solved independently by A.A. Markov, Jr. and E. Post 
in 1947. As a tool for presenting his results on Thue’s Problem Markov developed his 
concept of so called normal algorithms. (The term Markov’s algorithms came to use 
after Markov’s death). Later this concept established itself as the standard precise no- 
tion of algorithm in Markov’s Constructive Mathematics. In its volume it is equivalent 
to recursive functions or Turing’s machines. 
Markov’s publications on normal algorithms appeared as early as 195 1 ([47; an 
English translation]). In 1954 his famous monograph Theory of Algorithms ([48; an 
English Translation]) was published. This monograph can be probably considered as 
the first systematic presentation of the general theory of algorithms together with related 
semiotical problems. In particular, one can find there a mathematical theory of words 
as special types of sign complexes. As far as I know, such a theory was developed 
for the first time. On the other hand, scrupulous proofs that such and such normal 
algorithm works on given words in a certain way can be considered as the first examples 
of program correctness verification. At the same time Markov began to develop a 
mathematical worldview, and Mathematics in the framework of the above worldview, 
that was later to be known as “Markov’s (or Russian) constructive Mathematics”. 
Markov’s constructive Mathematics (MCM; see, e.g., [35,38,41,42,51-531) can be 
considered one of the three most important and coherent constructivist trends of our 
Century. The other two are Brouwer’s Intuitionism (see, e.g., [16,25,29,6163]) and 
Bishop’s constructive Mathematics (BCM) (see, e.g., [2-51). Chronologically, Markov 
stands between Brouwer and Bishop. 
3. Markov’s Constructive Mathematics (MCM) can be characterized by the following 
main features (cf., e.g., [35,51]). 
1. The objects of study are constructive processes, and constructive objects arising as 
the results of these processes. The concept of constructive object is primitive. The 
main feature of constructive objects is that they are constructed according to definite 
rules from certain elementary objects, which are indecomposable in the process of 
these constructions. Hence we deal with objects of a completely combinatorial and 
finite nature. Practically, for developing MCM it is enough to consider a special 
type of constructive object, namely a word in one or another alphabet. 
2. A special constructive logic is allowed to be used. This logic takes into account the 
specific nature of constructive objects and processes. In particular, the tertium non 
datur principle and the principle of double negation are not accepted as universal 
logical principles. An existential statement considered to be proved iff a constructive 
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process is presented that completed with the construction of the required constructive 
object. In the similar vein, to prove a disjunction means to present a constructive 
process that is completing with indicating the true member of the disjunction. In 
its main features constructive logic is similar to intuitionistic one. A sharp contrast, 
though presents so-called Markov’s principle (we will discuss it below) that is 
rejected by intuitionists. 
3. The abstraction of potential realizability is accepted, but the abstraction of actual 
infinity is completely rejected. The abstraction of potential realizability consists “in 
abstracting from the real limits of our constructive possibilities, imposed by the 
limited character of our lives in space and time” ([48, Ch.1, 3.51). 
4. The intuitive concept of effectiveness, computability, etc. is identified with one of 
the precise concept of algorithm (historically, with Markov’s normal algorithms). 
This means that a version of Church’s Thesis (The Principle of Normalization) is 
accepted. 
Evidently, MCM uses a considerably more “modest” system of abstractions than 
traditional mathematics and follows much more closely to our real constructive activi- 
ties. On the other side, it could be reproached from the “left”. I mean the champions 
of so-called feasible Mathematics. Indeed, the difference between the actual infinity 
and potential realizability (potential infinity in general philosophy) is more of an in- 
tellectual nature than of a practical one. The abstraction of the potential realizability 
allows one to move from constructive processes that develop before one’s eyes from 
the beginning till the end to imaginary constructive processes. The completion of such 
a process could often be established only as a result of an intellectual effort. Therefore 
it is beyond of practical feasibility. In particular, the abstraction of potential realizabil- 
ity allows us to admit that we can carry out the process of writing down words of 
arbitrary length, to add every two natural numbers, etc. The importance of this ideal- 
ization is self-evident. Its remoteness from practice is evident, as well. Nevertheless, 
potential realizability seems much less demanding than actual infinity that considers 
actually completed infinite collections of simultaneously existing objects. The abstrac- 
tion of potential realizability is essentially based on the part of the experience of an 
individual that connects him/her with society. If, indeed, an individual power of a 
particular human being is tragically finite, this being can comfort himself/herself with 
idea that his activities will be continued by his/her children, grandchildren, etc. There- 
fore his/her individual power can be increased as much as one would like. The very 
(optimistic) idea of our immortality as a species suggests the idea of the abstraction 
of potential realizability. On the other hand, when one watches, say, a line of elec- 
trical poles expanding to the horizon, even with the full knowledge that the line has 
its beginning and its end, it does not take a great strain of poetic imagination to feel 
that this sequences of poles is actually infinite. Markov’s Principle that was mentioned 
above adds another dimension to non-feasibility of MCM. It deals with possible proofs 
that a given algorithm completes its work on a given word. Markov’s Principle per- 
mits to use negative, “by contradiction” proofs. Namely, if the supposition that a given 
algorithm never stops on a given word was refuted, then one is permitted to conclude 
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that the algorithm completes its work on the given word. It is evident, that Markov’s 
Principle is a particular case of the double negation law (or for that matter tertium 
non dutur principle). Markov’s Principle was a subject of discussions and interest- 
ing metamathematical research (see, e.g. [16,29,63]) but it is my opinion that the 
acceptance/non-acceptance of this principle is a problem of rather a religious nature. 
All in all, MCM (like other main constructive trends that I have mentioned before) 
is an abstract theory and as such can be subjected to a criticism by “feasibilists”. 
There is no easy answer to this criticism. On one hand, every general theory needs 
some abstractions, on the otherhand no feasible definition of feasibility is known. To 
this I can add that even in its best years Markov’s School was not numerous therefore 
not every promising research path could be followed. As a step towards feasibility 
one can consider an unpublished work of Kreinovich [31] on Constructive Polynomial 
Analysis. The author considers constructive analysis as it was presented in Kushner’s 
monograph that had just been published at that time ([35, an English translation, 1973, 
the Russian original]) and undertakes a revision of involved theories replacing general 
computability by computability in polynomial time. It is a pity that this work with 
its significant results is still unpublished. Interesting discussion on the subject “general 
constructivity versus feasibility” can be found in Bishop [4] and in Gurevich [24]. 
It is worth noting that unfortunately there are only a few works on applications of 
theory of complexity of algorithms and calculations to Markov’s Constructive Analysis. 
It is rather surprising, as it was exactly in Markov’s School that pioneering works on 
complexity were done. I can mention here amazing results of G.S. Tseitin on lower 
bounds for step-counting functions for normal algorithms, obtained as early as 1956. I 
think that those were first results on metrical theory of algorithms at all. G.S. Tseitin 
did not publish his results at that time, they were formulated (without proofs) in 
Yanovskaya’s survey ([67, p. 444451); see, also [60 p. 9, 66 pp. 69-701. In 1964 
Markov [49] began his works on the complexity of normal algorithms, and a group 
of his students joined him. Among applications to Constructive Analysis one could 
mention Kushner [32] and Kanovich and Kushner [28]. 
Kushner [22] deals with the following problem (below, when we speak about partic- 
ular results obtained in MCM we understand under an “algorithm” a normal algorithm 
in some appropriate alphabet; sure, Turing machines and recursive functions can be 
meant with no principal differences). 
Let us say that a (normal) algorithm x computes a (say, classical) real number x 
if for every n a(n) is a rational number and Icr(n) - XI ~2~“. A real number x is 
said to be computable if there is an algorithm that computes x. Let now g be a total 
recursive function that we choose to be a measure of complexity of calculations. A 
computable real number x is hard-computable with respect to g if one can find an m 
such that for every n > m every algorithm c1 that calculates x takes more than g(n) steps 
on the input II. It is proved that for every g almost every computable real number is 
hard-computable. 
Kanovich and Kushner [28] deal with complexity of algorithms, using as a measure 
of complexity of an algorithm the length of its code in some natural system of coding. 
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Already in the earlier 1960s Markov suggested a new approach to unsolvable algorith- 
mic problems. Usually, an algorithmic problem P can be presented in the following 
form: find an algorithm CI such that for every IZ A(cc,n) holds, where A is a statement in 
the parameters CI and n. If it turns out that the required algorithm does not exist, we can 
try to consider a sequence of “restricted” problems P,,. The problem P, calls to con- 
struct an algorithm a such that A(a, m) holds for every m <n. Such an algorithm usually 
cannot fail to exist. We could try to find a recursive function g such that g(n) is a 
lower bound for complexity of algorithms solving P,,. If such function g is unbounded, 
then the original problem P is definitely algorithmically unsolvable as an algorithm 
satisfying P satisfies all P,. This approach is aimed to establish some quantitative 
characteristics of algorithmic unsolvability. In Kanovich and Kushner [28] it is shown 
that this scheme does not work in various natural algorithmically unsolvable problems 
of constructive analysis, like, say, one of solving systems of linear equations. In this 
case, a restricted problem consists in solving of systems with all non-zero minors begin 
greater by absolute value than 2?. It is interesting that the growth of the complexity 
of the relevant algorithms cannot be grasped by an unbounded recursive lower bound. 
MCM differs, roughly speaking, with Intuitionism in features 1, 4, and with BCM, 
in feature 4. As is well-known, one of the principal achievements of Brouwer was his 
non-pointwise, Aristotelian-style theory of the real continuum. A very specific tool of 
choice sequences was developed and used to reach this goal. Choice sequences can 
be considered as developing, incomplete mathematical objects and their theory was, 
probably, the first example of Mathematics of incomplete objects. In any case, they 
are not constructive objects in Markov’s sense and therefore they are outside of MCM. 
Bishop, in his turn, refused to identify intuitive constructivity, effectiveness, etc. with, 
say, recursiveness. (see, e.g. [2]). It is worth noting that the main part of Brouwer’s 
work on intuitionistic Mathematics was done before the concept of recursive function 
appeared on the mathematical scene. Heyting [26] once noted that had it been the other 
way, Brouwer probably would not have introduced choice sequences and it would have 
been a pity. I can only agree with the last part of the statement ~ it would be a pity 
not to have this marvelous concept today. On the other hand, I am not sure about 
the strength of this “probably” above; in fact, Brouwer rejected the pointwise concept 
of continuum because of very deep philosophical reasons, hence, in no way recursive 
functions would have satisfied him in his task of creating a non-Cantorian theory of 
the continuum. The problem was not so much to grasp the volume of the intuitive 
notion of computability (which is all what recursive functions are about) but rather to 
present mathematically the Aristotelian idea of a developing continuum. This brings in 
mathematical objects that are incomplete in principle. It seems that Brouwer did not 
express in any written form his position with respect of Church’s Thesis, and, as far as 
I know, there are no other evidences of his point of view in this respect. Nevertheless, 
it seems highly unlikely that Brouwer accepted Church’s Thesis and, anyway, it was 
not used in the body of Intuitionistic Mathematics developed by him and his disciples. 
Be that as it may, both Brouwer and Bishop did not join the Church’s Thesis Club, 
though Bishop considered the Thesis practically plausible. 
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I think that the “to be/not to be” decision with respect of the Church’s Thesis 
is of fundamental philosophical importance, though, a comparison of relatively close 
constructive trends of Markov and Bishop shows that Church’s Thesis is mostly irrel- 
evant when one is occupied with development of “practical” aspects of constructive 
mathematical analysis. However, it is of great worth if one wants, say, to investigate 
the continuity of computable operators or the continuity versus the uniform continuity 
in a computable setting, etc. Such problems are simply out of reach under Bishop’s 
approach. 
It is worth noting that Church’s Thesis was taken for a long time almost for granted 
by the mathematical community. In reality, this fundamental principle is not so ev- 
ident, in particular philosophically. Interesting discussions on this subject and on its 
history can be found in Kolmogorov and Uspensky [30], Feferman [18], Davis [12] 
and Mendelson [56]. 
4. An interesting feature of MCM is its pure syntactic mathematical universe. It is 
true that the same can be said with some reason about BCM. But Markov placed 
a special accent on this feature of his system. Constructive objects and constructive 
processes (algorithms) are the main (and essentially the only) Dramatis Personae on 
the scene. Thus constructive objects are considered to be initial data for algorithms and 
this point of view gives a very special touch to MCM which may be of interest for 
Computer Science. Let us consider an example. A classical real number can be defined 
as follows. Let c( be a Cauchy sequence of rational numbers. This means that 
Vn 3mV’ij(i,j>m 1 /SC(~) - a(j)1 <2-“). (1) 
Classically, real numbers are classes of equivalent Cauchy sequences. In MCM the 
arbitrary sequence above is to be replaced by an algorithm of the type N + Q, where 
N is the set of natural numbers (and natural numbers are words of type 0, 01,01 I . . . in 
the alphabet (0, I}) and Q is the set of rational numbers (which are words of a special 
type as well). Of course, one can speak here about a recursive function with rational 
values. As for (1 ), the strictest constructive reading of it will be as follows. There is 
an algorithm fi of type N --f FV such that 
Vnij(i,j > P(n) > IN(i) - a(j)1 < 2-n). 
Such algorithm p we call a Cauchy modulus for IX. The schemes of algorithms can be 
coded in some natural way by words (or by natural numbers). The code of CI we denote 
by &. A constructive real number (c.r.n.) is defined after it as a couple N’ * /?, where 
!_Y is an algorithm of the type N + Q, p is an algorithm of the type N -+ N and B is a 
Cauchy modulus for CI. Therefore, constructive real numbers are words in an alphabet. 
The set of constructive real numbers we denote by D. D is an adequate continuum for 
MCM and it nicely grasps the intuition of computability of a real number. 
The above concept of a constructive real number was introduced without mentioning 
classical reals. It arrived by itself as an original concept. This makes a characteristic 
difference with definitions of computable numbers in computable analysis where those 
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are usually introduced by selecting definitions, i.e. computable numbers are real num- 
bers that can be computed (in fact, we introduced such a notion in Section 3 above). 
It should be noted that, as natural as it is, the concept of a constructive real number 
is not completely evident, e.g., there is a temptation to consider computable system- 
atic expansions. And the first definition of computable number published by Turing 
[64,65] was exactly of this type. A correction [65] followed immediately. Deficiencies 
of computable expansions are discussed in Kushner [35]. The essence of those defi- 
ciencies was known already to Brouwer (see, e.g. [8]). It is enough to mention that, 
e.g., there is no algorithm for addition of computable systematic expansions. Another 
problem arising in connection with computable systematic expansions is under what 
conditions such a system with the base n is reducible to the system with the base m. 
The reducibility means here the existence of an algorithm that finds for every com- 
putable n-expansion an equal m-expansion. The following theorem of Mostowski and 
Uspensky deserves to be included into every text on mathematical analysis. 
Theorem. The system of n-expansions is reducible to the system of m-expansions ij” 
und only if all prime divisors of m are prime divisors of n. 
In particular, there is an algorithm to transform every decimal expansion into equal 
binary expansion, but there is no algorithm from binary expansions to decimal ones. 
A proof of Mostowski-Uspensky’s theorem and general discussion on the subject can 
be found in Kushner [35]. 
5. A constructive real number as a syntactic object holds in itself information suf- 
ficient to find in an effective way rational approximations to the number with every 
desirable accuracy. Nevertheless, some interesting variations of this concept are possi- 
ble. First of all it is possible to read (1) in a more liberal way, say as 
Vn-7 3 mVij(i, j > m 3 ICC(i) - a(j)1 <2-“). 
Formula (3), roughly speaking represents the classical Cauchy property. We can con- 
sider now a new type of computable real numbers. The word LX’, where !x satisfies 
(3) we call a pseudonumber. The set of all pseudonumbers will be denoted by P. 
P presents another model of constructive continuum. Reals from this continuum are 
computable in the sense that for every such number there is an algorithmic sequence 
of rational approximations that (classically) converges. But not only we do not have 
a recursive modulus of convergence included in the number-word, it can happen that 
such a modulus does not exist at all (this follows from a well-known result of Specker 
[59], see, also [35]). Therefore, there exist pseudonumbers that are not equal to any 
constructive real number. It is interesting that we can obtain two other variants of com- 
putable numbers in a rather syntactic way, by omitting information about a Cauchy 
modulus in the definition of constructive real numbers. We will call a word CI’ an 
F-number (quasinumber) if there is (cannot fail to be) a Cauchy modulus for 2. Let 
iF and Ild be the sets of all F-numbers and quasinumbers, respectively. To compare 
the four models of constructive continuum let us imagine, for a moment, that they are 
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placed on the classical real line. Every model singles out some computable numbers in 
the classical continuum. It is evident that P is wider in this sense than ID. But D, 1F and 
K are from this point of view the same. They single out exactly the same points on 
the classical real line. The syntactic difference between constructive real numbers and 
F-numbers (quasinumbers) is evident and they do look as quite different initial data 
for algorithms. It is well-known that the information about a Cauchy modulus that is 
absent in F-numbers (quasinumbers) cannot be restored in an effective way. Namely, 
there is no algorithm that finds for every F-number (quasinumber) p a constructive 
real number that is equal to p (see, e.g. [35]). 
On the other hand, F-numbers and quasinumbers are words of the same type, every 
F-number is a quasinumber and there is no quasinumber p such that p # q for every 
F-number q. The continuums [F and K are the same for a classical mathematician. One 
cannot tell one from another from the calssical point of view. But the difference is 
quite discernible constructively. There is a sequence of quasinumbers y that is not a 
sequence of F-numbers. Really, in order to prove that y is a sequence of F-numbers 
a constructivist should develop an algorithm that would give for every n a (code of) 
Cauchy modulus of y(n). For the sequence y mentioned above such an algorithm does 
not exist (see [35]). 
The difference between F-numbers and quasinumbers can be illustrated by a 
Brouwerian counterexample. Consider an algorithm x such that 
a(n)= 
i 
1 if there is a perfect number among the numbers 2i + 1 where i <n, 
0 otherwise. 
It is evident that if there is no odd perfect number then 
tln(a(n)=O) 
and if 2i + 1 is the least odd perfect number than 
rL(n) = 1 0 ifn<i, I if n>,i. 
It is evident that c( cannot fail to have a Cauchy modulus, hence LX’ is a quasinumber. 
But nobody could present such a Cauchy modulus J? today. Indeed, it is clear that an 
odd perfect integer exists iff c@(l)+ 1) = 1. Thus one cannot state that the quasinumber 
CY’ is an F-number. 
The splitting of a classical concept (the concept of a Cauchy sequence above) into 
several constructive concepts is a common thing in any constructive mathematics, 
but the syntactic splitting (e.g., constructive real numbers versus F-numbers or quasi- 
numbers) is very characteristic for MCM with its syntactic mathematical universe. The 
same can be said about the subtle difference between quasinumbers and F-numbers. 
All in all, we have four pretenders to bear the title of constructive continuum. It is 
interesting to notice that the completeness theorem holds for ID, P’, (F, but it does not 
hold for 116 (there is a (constructive) Cauchy sequence of quasinumbers that does not 
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have the limit). Certainly, ED looks like the most attractive constructive continuum. Let 
us consider it in more detail. 
6. The equality and order relations on D can be introduced in an obvious way (see 
[35]). There is no problem to develop arithmetics of c.r.n.-s, and the arithmetic oper- 
ations over c.r.n.-s are algorithmic (see [35]). On the other hand, the usual dichotomy 
\Jx(x = OVxfO) (4) 
does not survive a scrutiny for effectiveness. There is no algorithm that would indicate 
for every c.r.n. x the true member of the disjunction in (4). This fact could be illustrated 
by a Brouwerian counterexample in the spirit of Section 5, but I rather sketch a proof 
in the spirit of the theory of algorithms. Let CY be an algorithm. One can construct to x 
an algorithm [a] that is defined on every input m, n, [a](n,m) is a natural number and 
[u](m,n) = 1 iff z completes its work on m for no more than n steps. (Here = stands 
for a syntactic, decidable equality over natural numbers.) In other words, having input 
m,n [r] makes CI to work step by step on m. If before of the nth step or on the nth 
step CI completed its work, then [c(] stops with output 1, otherwise after the nth step 
of c( it stops with output other than 1. 
Let now c( be an algorithm with unsolvable halting problem. Consider an algorithm 
7 such that 
if [a](m, n) = 1, I <n is the least number such that [a](m, I)= I, 
otherwise. 
It is evident that for every fixed m y presents a Cauchy sequence and the algorithm Id 
such that Vn(ld(n) =n) is a Cauchy modulus for this sequence. Moreover, if r does 
not stop on m, then 
Vn(y(m, n) = 0) 
and if z completes its work on m exactly in 1 steps then 
bz((n31>([a](m,n)=2-‘)) 
Therefore, we can construct an algorithm A such that for every n A(m) is a c.r.n. 
and i(m) = 0 iff x does not stop on m. This completes the proof. In the terms of 
constructive logic we can conclude that 
+x(x=ovx#o) (5) 
The statement (5) looks paradoxical for a mathematician with a completely classical 
training. But the paradox disappears if one takes into account that the V in (5) stands for 
the constructive disjunction that is much different of its classical counterpart. Perhaps, 
the tradition to use the same notations for quite different logical operators is responsible 
for many cases of misunderstanding. The impossibility of an algorithm expressed in 
(5) is a fact of classical mathematics, as well. From (5) one concludes that trichotomy 
law fails constructively, i.e. 
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Using a rather more subtle construction with an algorithm that takes only values 0 and 
1 and cannot be extended to a totally defined algorithm we could prove 
++~ovxxo) (6) 
This means that there is no algorithm to find for every c.r.n. x the true member of 
disjunction in (6). On the other hand, if a and b are c.r.n.-s and a < b one can easily 
prove that 
b’x(x<bVx>a) (7) 
holds constructively. In many situations (7) can replace reasoning by considering cases 
x <a, x 3 a and therefore obtain constructive proofs for the corresponding classical 
statements. 
As every c.r.n. is a word in an alphabet the question arises if D deserves the title 
“continuum”. From the traditional point of view it is a countable, and, therefore, discrete 
set. But it is so for an outsider only. If somebody lives in the constructive mathematical 
universe, this person can reproduce usual Cantor’s diagonal construction and prove that 
the constructive continuum is (constructively) uncountable. More precisely, there is an 
algorithm that finds for every constructive (i.e. algorithmic) sequence of c.r.n.-s a 
c.r.n. that differs of every member of this sequence. This situation should be familiar 
to every mathematician who studied the Model Theory. To this one could add that 
D is constructively complete. It means that the Cauchy Criterion is true, that every 
constructive sequence of closed intervals has the inhabited intersection etc. 
This sunny picture is somehow clouded by the failure of classical compactness prin- 
ciples that are responsible for a number of theoretical results on classical continuum 
(especially, the uniform continuity theorem). Specker [59] gave an example of a recur- 
sive increasing sequence of rational numbers from the unit interval such that it has no 
algorithmic Cauchy modulus. Therefore, this sequence does not converge to any c.r.n., 
has no limit point in ED, the set of values of it has no exact upper bound in ID, etc. It is 
interesting to note that Specker’s sequence converges to a pseudonumber. In Kushner 
[34] one can find a construction of a constructive sequence of rational numbers from 
the unit interval that has no limit points in the continuum of pseudonumbers P. As 
it is noted in [34] this result is rather precise because a limit point of every bounded 
algorithmic sequences could be “caught” on the next natural level of liberalization of 
the concept of constructive continuum. Those theorems could be considered outside of 
any foundational context as important additions to the classical Bolzano-Weierstrass 
theorems. 
Another amazing property of constructive continuum is the existence of so-called 
singular coverings. Let us say, that a constructive sequence of open rational intervals 
is a covering of D if for every c.r.n. x one can find an interval in the above sequence 
that covers x. A sequence Y of intervals said to be s-bounded if for every n 
i: Iy(n)l<E 
n=O 
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Tseitin and Zaslavsky (in 1956) and Kraisel and Lacombe (in 1957) proved that for 
every positive E one can construct a constructive open rational c-bounded covering 
of D. An s-bounded covering of the closed unit interval is said to be singular if 
E < 1. Therefore, singular coverings do exist. The above results suggest an unpleasant 
conclusion that the constructive line has the measure 0. But again the situation is not 
so simple. Let us consider the series of the lengths of intervals of a sequence Y 
It can be proved that if Y is a singular covering, then the above series is “Speckerian” 
i.e. it does not converge constructively. If we exclude Speckerian coverings, then no 
singular covering is possible and all the above phenomenon disappears. This remark 
opens a way for developing a reasonable constructive measure theory. A number of 
works in this directions were published, indeed. I would specially mention the re- 
markable works of Demuth and his followers (see, e.g. [ 13-151). Still, in my opinion 
constructive measure theory lacks classical beauty of the classical theory of the same 
name. 
Let us return for a moment to a singular covering. It is evident, that no finite 
subcovering is possible in this a case. Hence, we see that Borel’s lemma fails for 
the closed constructive interval [O,l]. This fact is a source for constructive functions 
with unusual properties (we discuss this subject in short in the next section). This 
phenomenon is closely related to the very important result due to Kleene and Zaslavsky 
(see, e.g. [35]): there is a decidable infinite binary tree such that every general-recursive 
path in it is finite. It means that crucial K&rig’s lemma fails in the constructive setting. 
All in all, the constructive (computable) continuum is something on its own, a new, 
interesting model for expanding the set of rational numbers into directions known from 
the ancient times. 
One can ask a question what a concept of real numbers, classical, or constructive, is 
closer to the physical reality. In my opinion, to this reality are much closer Browerian 
developing numbers, e.g., consider, say, the velocity of the light c. One has a feeling 
that c is a real number in the usual sense of the term and, indeed, it is treated in related 
theories as a real number. But let us ask ourselves an innocent question whether c is 
rational or not. Hardly any reasonable answer is possible. The point is that in reality 
c is not given by any mathematical law, it is a developing number, we can get from 
experience better and better approximations to it but that is all. Why then law-like, 
static numbers of classical (or for that matter constructive) continuum are so successful 
in physical theories? It is a point worth thinking about. 
7. When it came to the concept of a constructive (computable) real number one can 
say that this notion is well-established. Various researches and schools differ here only 
in technical and foundational nuances, all of them arriving to concepts analogous to 
the concept of a c.r.n. that was introduced above. But the situation is more complicated 
when one wants to consider computable real functions. From the point of view of the 
Foundations of Mathematics an approach through algorithms that have approximations 
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to arguments as inputs and approximations to the results as outputs looks quite attrac- 
tive. Unfortunately, this approach usually lead to the constructions that are remote of 
intuition and to very sophisticated notations (see, e.g. [22]). Markov introduced here 
a straightforward definition that was inspired by the classical Lobachevsky-Dirichlet 
concept of a function as a point-to-point mapping. For the sake of shortness we will 
consider here only everywhere defined functions. A constructive function by Markov 
is an algorithm f whose arguments and values are c.r.n.-s and such that for every 
two equal c.r.n.-s XI and x2 the values f(xl) and f(x2) are equal c.r.n.-s (of course, 
the equality relation over [I3r is meant here). The concept of a constructive function 
(cf.) was introduced by Markov circa 1952. Approximately at the same time com- 
putable functions over reals were considered by Lacombe [44] and Grzegorczyk [23]. 
Their definitions, though different in appearance, have one important thing in common. 
Roughly speaking, in both cases computable functions are defined by selecting defi- 
nitions (a classical function is computable if...) using some type of partial-recursive 
operators that are defined on all classical sequences. The last condition implies com- 
putable uniform continuity of functions under consideration. A recent definition of 
Pour-El and Richards [57] is similar to the above ones, but the condition of com- 
putable uniform continuity is included into the definition by a type of a “legislative 
act” while in the Lacombe and Grzegorczyk cases this property was established as a 
theorem. I do not see any foundational or intellectual reason to force an uniform con- 
tinuity property into a general definition of a computable function. Uniform continuity 
is a complicated concept that was recognized only at the end of the last century and 
hardly it has any direct correlation with our intuition of computability over computable 
reals. Moreover, uniform continuity in a constructive (computable) setting is a quite 
interesting subject to study. It is easy to see that the class of functions computable by 
Lacombe or Grzegorczyk or Pour-El-Richards is the same, as the class of c.f.-s that 
are constructively uniform continuous. A more thorough analysis of the above concepts 
of computability and a comparison with Markov’s approach can be found in Kushner 
[331. 
A very interesting concept of a computable real function was introduced in the 
Polish School of Computable Analysis (see., [l, 551). A (classical) real function is 
computable by Banach-Mazur if it transforms every computable sequence of c.r.n.-s 
into a computable sequence of c.r.n.-s. It is evident that every cf. is computable by 
Banach-Mazur. As for the inverse statement it is still an open problem, though an 
old (and sophisticated) counterexample of Friedberg for the similar problem in the 
Baire space suggests that there are functions that are computable by Banach-Mazur, 
but not by Markov. It is easy to see that if a Banach-Mazur computable function is 
computably continuous on D than it can be represented as a c.f. Since on the other 
hand a Banach-Mazur computable function cannot have a constructive discontinuity, 
the required counterexample cannot be a simple one. 
It is worth noting that probably the first, though yet not rigorous, consideration 
of computable functions over reals is due to Bore1 [6]. His ideas in Philosophy of 
Mathematics are presented in the monograph Bore1 [7] (famous correspondence between 
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leading French Mathematicians concerning Foundations can be found in this book, too). 
In Borel’s writings one can find prophecies of many further results in computable 
analysis including properties of continuity of computable functions. One can guess that 
Brouwer’s Principle of continuity was inspired by Bore1 (and, incidentally, it was Bore1 
who introduced choice sequences). 
The phenomenon, presented in (6), can be traced later while solving various types of 
equations. Consider, e.g., a c.f. h such that h(x) = Ix + 11 + Ix - 11 - 2. It is easy to see 
that: (1) h(x)=-2-2 forxd-1; (2) h(x)=0 for -1bxbl; (3) /2(x)=2x-2 for 
1 bx. Consider now a family of c.f.-s fC such that f;.(x) = h(x) + c where c is a c.r.n. 
It is evident that if c < 0 than every root of fC is not less than - 1, and if c 3 0 then 
every root of fC is not greater than 1. Considering (6) and (7) one concludes that there 
is no algorithm to find roots of continuous functions that have values of different signs 
at the endpoints of a given interval. But a more dramatic question arises: perhaps it 
is possible that a continuous c.f. that accepts values of different signs at the endpoints 
of an interval can have no roots on this interval, e.g. what if the graph of such a 
function intersects the x-axis at a “non-constructive” point? Fortunately, the answer 
to this question is “no”. Every such c.f. cannot fail to have a root, and this root 
can be even found in the form of a quasinumber. On the other hand, Manukyan [45] 
constructed the following amazing counterexample: 
Theorem. There are two constructive (und therefore continuous) planar curves (p, 
and (p2 such that 
(1) cp,(O)=(O,O), cp1(1)=(1,1); 
(2) (P2(0)=(0,1), (P,(l)=(1,0); 
(3) fix every O<t< 1 both q,(t) and (P*(t) belong to the open unit square; 
(4) Cp, and (p2 do not intersect. 
Thus the above continuous curves connect diametrically opposed vertices of the unit 
square, they do not leave this square and still they do not intersect! 
One can consider this example as an argument that the immediate intuition of con- 
tinuity is not grasped by D. However, this argument can be met by reference to 
well-known topological examples, like Peano’s curve, etc, that show that this very 
immediate intuition is not quite a reliable facility and sometimes even mislead us. 
Usual Calculus can be readily developed starting with c.r.n.-s and c.f-s. This work is 
done in [35]. There is no problems in “retelling” big parts of the theory of differential 
equations, etc. Basically speaking, when one is doing with usual functions of Mathe- 
matical Analysis there is no great difference between the constructive and traditional 
versions. But when one arrives on the more elevated theoretical ground the landscapes 
are quite different. A comparison of (5) and (7) already suggests that every c.f. should 
have some properties of continuity. Indeed, a function sgn such that 
-1 if x<O 
sgn(n) = 0 ifx-0 
1 ifx>O 
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is evidently not computable. There is no constructive function with this property. This 
remark can be straightened to a general theorem stating that a cf. cannot have a con- 
structive discontinuity. This theorem was proved by Markov as early as 1953. A similar 
result was obtained at the same time by Mazur (for Banach-Mazur computability). Far 
less evident and even amazing is the continuity theorem proved by G.S. Tseitin (and 
in a different setting by Kraisel, Lacombe and Schoenfild; the history of this discovery 
can be found in [35], where the continuity theorem is proved in its general version 
(due to Tseitin) for algorithmic operators in constructive metric spaces). Let f be a 
c.f. and x is a c.r.n. An algorithm CI of the type N + N is a modulus of continuity for 
,f at x if 
tin xl(jxl --xl <2-“(n) 1 If(Q) - f(x)1 <2_“). 
The following theorem about the constructive continuity of every constructive function 
holds. 
Theorem. For every c.f f and c.r.11. x one can eflectively find a modulus of continuity 
fbr f at x. 
This result heavily depends on Church’s Thesis and Markov’s Principle. An amazing 
fact behind it is that the effective continuity of f is established using as the initial data 
only an algorithm that computes f. So, e.g., a modulus of continuity of, say, sinx at a 
given constructive point can be found using only an algorithm that computes c.f. sin. 
As Kiinig’s (and, therefore, Borel’s) Lemma fails in MCM one can expect that c.f.-s, 
though being continuous, may have unusual properties. A c.f. f is said to be effectively 
non-uniformly continuous on the closed unit interval if there exist a positive rational 
number r and two algorithms a and B that are sequences of rational numbers from the 
unit segment and such that 
Vn(I@) - B(n)1 <r” & If(4n>> - fWn>>l2r) 
After what was said it comes as no surprise that effectively non-uniform continuous c.f.- 
s. do exist. Various examples of c.f.-s with unusual properties are presented in [35]. 
Using, e.g., cf.-s that are non-integrable (such examples can be found even among 
cf.-s that are classically uniformly continuous) one can obtain the following results, 
concerning differential equations [4143]: (1) there is a separable (and therefore linear) 
computable first-order d.e. that has no computable solutions (all the classical solutions 
are not computable); (2) there is a computable Dirichlet problem for the unit circle 
that has no computable solution (the classical solution is not computable at the center 
of the circle). 
In his work of 1958 Godel suggested a new interpretation of intuitionistic arithmetic 
(so called Dialectica-interpretation) by means of computable functions of finite types 
(the last concept was introduced in the same paper). Hence, the task of developing of 
an universe of computable functions of finite types arises. Two ways of approaching the 
problem are evident. One is to enumerate objects of lower types and use such Giidel 
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numbers as initial data for functions of higher types, another is to use approximations 
to function-arguments, i.e. some topological structure for functions of lower types. 
In the first case we would speak of Markov operators, in the second of Kleene op- 
erators. A comprehensive theory of computable functions of finite types was later 
developed topologically in the frameworks of Markov’s constructive mathematics by 
Chernov [9-l 11. It is worth noting that everywhere defined constructive functions (the 
counterpart to the classical concept of a everywhere defined real function) can be con- 
sidered in the spirit of Gddel’s approach as computable functions of type ((O,O),(O,O)) 
with some restrictions on the domain and closure conditions on the range. As was men- 
tioned above, two main ways to operate constructively with (0,O) objects are known: 
using approximations (e.g. in Baire space) or Godel codes (numbers) of (0,O) objects. 
In the first case we arrive to Kleene’s partial-recursive operators, in the second case we 
deal with Markov’s constructive functions. It seems that more information about the 
argument-function is available for a Markov operator than for an operator of Kleene 
which uses only “beginnings” of the argument-functions. This effect can be really felt in 
the case of not everywhere defined operators (Muchnik-Friedberg counterexample, see, 
e.g., [35]). But the already mentioned Kreisel-Lacombe-Schoenfield-Tseitin Continuity 
theorem states that the two above-mentioned approaches are equivalent for construc- 
tive functions that are everywhere defined on Markov’s constructive continuum. On 
the other hand, some results of the author [34] show that the “Godel numbers” ap- 
proach gives a wider class of computable functions than partial-recursive operators if 
one considers functions everywhere defined on a more liberal version of Markov’s 
constructive continuum, namely P. These results turn out to be closely related to the 
problem of the compactification of constructive continuum and to uniform continuity 
of constructive functions. We mention the following theorem (technical detail can be 
found in [34,35]). 
Theorem. 1. If a constructive junction f is everywhere dejined and a Kleene operator 
that computes f on the closed constructive unit interval is dejined for all pseudonum- 
bers of this interval, then f is constructively uniformly continuous on this interval. 
2. There is an everywhere defined constructive function g such that there is an 
algorithm G of type P + P that extends g and, nevertheless, g is eflectively non- 
umformly continuous on the closed unit interval. 
8. Both MCM and BCM took a lot from Brouwer, especially in their critical approach 
to the set-theoretical (classical) Mathematics and in their understanding of construc- 
tive logical operators. I have tried to describe the mathematical and human relations 
between Markov and Bishop, between MCM and BCM in my essay [41] (there exists 
also a Russian version of this essay [39,40]). It seems in general that Bishop’s ap- 
proach to constructive mathematics was mostly pragmatic and foundational problems 
did not attract him - at least, they were not supposed to be brought in at the ex- 
pense of concrete mathematical activities. Nevertheless, Bishop still did not avoid the 
eternal problem of understanding of implication, this host of Hamlet’s father of any 
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constructive mathematics (see, [3]). It is worth mentioning that Markov spent the last 
years of his life struggling to develop a large semantical system to achieve, above all, 
a satisfactory theory of implication (see, e.g., [52,53]). BCM can be considered as 
neutral in the sense that its results are acceptable both intuitionistically and in MCM. 
So the remarkable body of mathematical analysis that was built in BCM by Bishop 
himself and his disciples contributes to the claims of Intuitionism and MCM. 
Very interesting remarks, revealing Markov’s position with respect of Intuitionism, 
can be found in his Editor’s Comments to the Russian translation of Heyting’s book 
[25] ([50]). As is known, Heyting’s book is written artistically in the form of a discus- 
sion between several dramatis personae, like Clas, Int, Form etc. In his remarks Markov 
introduced a new person Con (a Constructivist). Perhaps, it would be interesting to see 
an edition of Heyting’s book with Markov’s remarks translated and incorporated into 
the text. 
9. The 1960s and 1970s were the best years for MCM. It had active centers in 
Moscow (headed by Markov), in Leningrad (headed by N.A. Shanin), in 
Erevan (headed by I.D. Zaslavsky) and in Prague (headed by Demuth). Numerous 
impressive results were obtained in constructive Analysis, constructive Logic, Theory 
of Algorithms, Theory of Complexity of Algorithms and Calculations, and Philosophy 
of Mathematics. Each of those centers had a particular face, e.g., pioneering works on 
automatic theorem proving were done in Leningrad under Shanin’s leadership. A body 
of work on constructive functional analysis was created in Prague by Oswald Demuth 
and his disciples (see, e.g., [13-15,35,38]). 
MCM was often criticized for a “negativistic” bias. What can I say? One should un- 
derstand the mathematical reality that constructivists (and there were always very few 
of them!) had faced. On one side there was a rich cultivated territory. I mean classical 
Analysis, many parts of which could be more or less easily converted into a “positive” 
constructive mathematics. On the other side, there was an exiting terra incognitu on 
the borders of computability where ordinary common sense-type intuition often faded 
away. I myself was much more tempted by this completely new territories than by 
“rewriting” classical theories, statements by statements. Still, one should not underes- 
timate the significance of so-called negative results, e.g. above-mentioned algorithmic 
results around BolzanoWeierstrass theorem about limit points of a bounded sequence 
definitely give a new insight and can be with full reasons included into advanced texts 
on Mathematical Analysis. In particular, they support a conviction which can be traced 
back to Russel, Whitehead and H. Weyl that the exact border of a bounded set may be 
an object of a higher level than the set itself. To this 1 can add that thanks to the excel- 
lent results of Gel’fond [ 19,201 the “rewriting” activities in MCM can be dramatically 
simplified using some type of negative translations (the idea of negative translations as 
it is well-known was developed by Kolmogorov, and then by Giidel [21]). This offers 
a very nice road for a constructivist, but, somehow, I am not eager to enter it. It is a 
nice highway, good driving is guaranteed but...one hardly will find a scenic view on it. 
So here is a question: was it all in vain? I do not think so. Though it does not look that 
Mathematics will be reshaped in the way MCM suggests, many valuable achievements 
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of MCM cannot be denied. I have in mind, first of all, the results on computability and 
a clarification of philosophical and technical problems behind it. Constructive Mathe- 
matics, as such, now attracts attention of scientists working in Computer Science (see, 
e.g., a very insightful article of Gurevich [24]). Then, one can find challenging to build, 
say, Mathematical Analysis using much more restrictive tools, than usually (like, one 
can be interested in comparison, say, geometrical constructions with a compass only 
versus constructions with classical instruments, etc). 
The bold attempt to develop Mathematics in the framework of a coherent constructive 
mathematical worldoutlook that was undertaken by A.A. Markov, Jr. and his follow- 
ers will beyond doubt be remembered as an exciting chapter in the History of the 
Mathematics of our century. 
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